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This paper empirically examines the short and long term FDI impact of Gulf 
Cooperation Countries (GCC) countries contracting of bilateral investment 
treaties and distinguishes it by the income level of the contracting partner. 
Using panel data for the period 1984-2002 and adopting a GMM estimation 
methodology, the paper finds that domestic property rights protection institutions, 
as opposed to investment treaties, matter more for OECD investors. It also finds 
that while ratified BITs with upper middle income countries have a surprisingly 
negative, though relatively weak, impact, ratified BITs with high income non-
OECD countries have a strong positive short and long term impact.
1. Introduction
Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) are legal instruments under international 
law between two contracting countries, the aim of which is to establish clear, 
simple, and enforceable rules for the reciprocal protection of foreign investment 
from expropriation in each contracting country. A BIT identifies the circumstances 
under which government expropriation of foreign investment can take place and 
the associated compensation standards, and establishes an investment dispute 
settlement mechanism . BITs therefore externally commit contracting countries to 
honouring the property rights of the partner country’s investors and reduce host 
country political risks. As a result, BITs increase foreign investors’ confidence 
and promote foreign investment (Hallward-Driemeier, 2003; Neumayer and 
Spess, 2005; UNCTAD, 1998) .
The GCC countries have contracted, i.e. signed or ratified, an increasing 
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number of bilateral investment treaties since 1990 to promote FDI . The 
rationale behind this increase is controversial, however . On the one hand, the 
GCC countries may have contracted BITs out of recognition of the positive 
influence of commitment to property rights protection for foreign investment. 
The GCC countries greatly desire such positive influence in light of their plans 
for economic diversification, and the lagging performance of their domestic 
institutions. In pursuing economic diversification, the GCC countries need to 
attract foreign investors into non-oil industries . These foreign investors are new 
to the GCC countries and are not the traditional foreign oil companies with which 
the GCC countries have historically established trusted business relationships . 
Contracting BITs would therefore reduce the risk of government expropriation 
risk for new investors .
On the other hand, BITs may not be beneficial in promoting foreign 
investment in the GCC countries for two important reasons. The first reason is 
that FDI in GCC countries has historically been associated with oil exploration 
and extraction, despite the absence of BITs . Contracting BITs may therefore be 
unnecessary for the GCC countries, with a likely inelastic response of FDI to 
BIT contracting .
The second reason is associated with the institutional copying hypothesis, 
which Ginsburg (2005) raises . He argues that institutional copying is one 
possible explanation for why states contract BITs, given the minimal effect on 
investment flows found in the early empirical literature. Because of their “desire 
to seem modern,” states get involved in institutional copying . In light of the 
strong competition among the GCC countries to promote their global image as 
modern, competitive economies, and the sharp increase in the number of BITs 
contracted by GCC countries since 1990, it is possible that GCC countries may 
have been involved in institutional copying . This view may be further supported 
by the fact that in the 1990s the GCC countries signed 43 BITs with lower middle 
income and low income countries, despite their limited investment potential, as 
opposed to 37 BITs with high income and upper middle income countries with 
more investment potential .
Given the controversy surrounding the FDI benefits of BITs, the purpose of 
this paper is to examine empirically the impact of BITs on FDI in GCC countries, 
in both the short and long terms . This distinction is important, as the response of 
investors to BIT contracting may be sluggish in the short term . Foreign investors 
in the non-oil sector may take a long time to observe the actual commitment of 
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the GCC governments to the protection of property rights . In addition, foreign 
investment in oil exploration and extraction takes place over a long period of 
time . In examining BITs impact, the paper distinguishes BITs by the income 
level of the contracting partner in order to account for GCC countries different 
BITs contracting motives .
Using panel data for the period 1984–2002, the paper adopts a generalized 
method of moments (GMM) estimation methodology to deal with endogeneity 
resulting from reverse causal relationship between FDI and BITs . Although 
from a host country perspective, contracting BITs may encourage FDI, FDI 
may encourage home countries to contract BITs in order to protect investments . 
Endogeneity also results from the omission of time-invariant unobservable 
country effects, such as the degree of strength of foreign relations between 
the GCC and OECD countries such as France, Germany, and Italy . The paper 
finds that while ratified BITs, reflecting actual commitment to property rights 
protection, with high income non-OECD countries have a strong positive short 
and long term impact on FDI, ratified BITs with upper middle income countries 
have a surprisingly negative, though relatively weak, impact . The paper also 
finds that investors from OECD countries seem to weigh the strength of domestic 
institutional function of property rights protection in their foreign investment 
decisions as opposed to the intended strengthening through BITs .
This paper contributes to the international law and FDI literature(s), in 
which the impact of BITs was examined, in one main respect . It examines for the 
first time in the literature the short and long term FDI impact of BITs contracted 
by GCC countries . Characteristic of the GCC countries are the oil resources 
which lure resource-seeking FDI, the desire to diversify their economies and 
attract non-oil FDI, and the lagging performance of property rights protection 
compared to other GCC domestic institutions . These characteristics enrich and 
flavour the context in which the impact of BITs is examined.
The paper proceeds as follows . Section 2 discusses the FDI and BITs 
experience of the GCC countries. Section 3 briefly presents the findings 
of the empirical literature on the FDI impact of BITs . Section 4 discusses 
the empirical model and its underlying theoretical framework, conceptual 
issues, and data . Section 5 discusses empirical issues and the estimation 
methodology . Section 6 discusses the empirical results; section 7 explores 
the robustness of the results, while section 8 presents the conclusion . 
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2. FDI and BITS in GCC countries
The accumulated FDI in GCC countries started to accelerate significantly 
after 1990. Parallel to the acceleration of FDI was a significant increase in the 
number of BITs contracted in the 1990s and 2000s . As shown in Table 1, the 
GCC countries signed 80 BITs in the 1990s–more than seven times the number 
signed in the 1980s (eleven BITs). The increase in the number of BITs ratified in 
the 1990s and 2000s is even more pronounced. The 57 BITs ratified in the 1990s 
were more than 11 times those ratified in the 1980s (five BITs). In the first four 
years of the present century alone, GCC countries ratified forty BITs (about 70 
percent of those ratified during the whole decade of the 1990s).
The breakdown of BITs by income level of the GCC contracting partner 
reveals that about half the BITs were contracted with lower middle and low 
income countries with limited investment potential . 1 Since 1990, GCC countries 
signed most BITs (46) with lower middle income countries, followed by 41 with 
high income OECD countries, 25 with low income countries, 14 with upper 
middle income countries, and four with high income non-OECD countries . 2 
A similar pattern is observed for BITs ratified, where the largest number (39) 
was with lower middle income countries, followed by high income OECD (36), 
upper middle (11), low income (10), and high income, non-OECD countries (1) .
These statistics raise two important research questions, which this paper 
examines . First, have BITs contracted by the GCC countries had a positive 
impact on inward FDI? If so, has the impact on FDI differed by the income level 
of contracting partners?
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Table 1 . BITs and FDI: Data and Statistics
BITs Data: Number of Signed and Ratified BITs
1980–1990 1991–2000 2001–2004
Signed BITs 11 80 50
Ratified BITs 5 57 40
Number of Signed BITs by Income Level of Contracting Partner
High income OECD 3 26 15
High income non-OECD 0 3 1
Upper middle income 3 8 6
Lower middle income 4 29 17
Low income 1 14 11
Number of Ratified BITs by Income Level of Contracting Partner
High income OECD 3 22 14
High income non-OECD 0 1 0
Upper middle income 0 8 3
Low middle income 1 20 19
Low income 1 6 4










All* 0 .456 2 .74 0 .597 2 .67
High income OECD 0 .437 2 .69 0 .487 2 .64
High income non-OECD 0 .578 2 .65 0 .065 2 .76
Upper middle income 0 .508 2 .64 0 .533 2 .63
Lower middle income 0 .614 2 .7 0 .509 2 .69
Low income 0 .347 2 .72 0 .612 2 .62
*. “All” refers to non-income-distinguished BITs.
3. Impact of BITS on FDI in empirical literature
The impact of BITs on FDI has been examined in the FDI and international 
law literature(s). The findings in both have been mixed. Earlier studies, namely 
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UNCTAD (1998) and Hallward-Driemeier (2003) found insignificant impact on 
FDI, while the more recent studies, namely Egger and Merlo (2007), Egger and 
Pfaffermayr (2004), Neumayer and Spess (2005), and Tobin and Rose-Ackerman 
(2006), found a significant positive impact on FDI.
UNCTAD’s (1998) landmark study has examined the impact of BITs on FDI 
using both time series and cross section analyses . Time series analysis has been 
conducted using data over eleven years and two hundred BITs signed between 
fourteen home and seventy two host countries. The study finds that BITs have 
a positive, albeit not a strong effect on FDI . However, the impact of BITs was 
most statistically significant for the share of a home country partner to a BIT in 
a host country’s total inflows, and for the share of a particular host country in a 
home country’s total FDI outflows. The cross section analysis of the study finds 
a positive impact of BITs on the absolute level of FDI flows and on FDI flows 
relative to GDP . The overall conclusion of the cross section analysis is that BITs 
play a minor and secondary role in attracting FDI, while the leading determinant 
appears to be market size . Similar to the conclusion of the UNCTAD study, 
Hallward-Driemeier (2003) finds little evidence of a beneficial impact of BITs 
on FDI in countries with reasonably strong institutions in examining the impact 
of ratified BITs on bilateral FDI flows from twenty OECD countries to thirty one 
developing countries over the period 1980–2000 .
In contrast to the above two studies, Egger and Pfaffermayr (2004) find 
that signed and ratified BITs exert a significant positive impact on the stock of 
outward FDI of nineteen OECD home countries into fifty four host countries 
(both OECD and non-OECD) for the period 1982–1997. They find that the 
impact is higher for ratified BITs as opposed to signed BITs. Similarly Neumayer 
and Spess (2005) find that BITs have a significant positive impact on FDI flows 
to 119 developing countries for a longer time period (1970–2001) . Also Tobin 
and Rose-Ackerman (2006), in studying the impact of BITs contracted between 
home OECD countries and host developing countries during the period 1980–
2003, find that the number of BITs contracted has a positive impact on FDI 
in subsequent periods but their marginal impact diminishes as the number of 
globally contracted BITs increases .
One drawback of the above studies is the failure to take into account the 
dynamic effect of BITs . Egger and Merlo (2007) overcome this drawback by 
addressing the dynamic adjustment of FDI in the long run . Using bilateral FDI 
stocks covering twenty four home and twenty eight host OECD and transition 
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countries in the period 1980–2001, and adopting the first-differenced GMM 
estimator, they find that the long run impact of BITs on FDI is nearly twice 
the short run effect, with the former amounting to 8 .9 percent, while the latter 
amounts to 4 .8 percent .
4. Theoretical framework, empirical model, conceptual issues, and data
The theoretical framework for this paper builds on the location advantage 
hypothesis of Dunning’s (1981) ownership-location-internalization (OLI) 
paradigm. The OLI paradigm asserts that in order to produce abroad a firm 
utilizes ownership, location, and internalization advantages it has . The 
ownership advantage stems from the firm’s ownership of intangible assets, 
such as technology, patents, and skilled management . The location advantage 
arises from the assets that foreign markets supply, such as abundant natural 
resources, large market size, cheap factors of production, and friendly business 
environment. These assets attract firms to produce abroad. The internalization 
advantage emanates from the firm’s engagement in production abroad itself 
rather than relying on the market, in the form of licensing or subcontracting 
for example, because of the higher transaction costs of the latter . While both 
ownership and internalization advantages are firm specific, location advantages 
are host country-specific.
The GCC countries location factors can be thought of along the World Bank’s 
MENA countries classification according to the abundance of their natural and 
human resources . From a natural resources perspective, the proven oil reserves of 
the GCC countries account for nearly 40 percent of world reserves, respectively, 
which lure resource-seeking FDI in particular from OECD countries . 3 From a 
human resources perspective and of relevance to FDI is the skilled labor force . 
The GCC countries are characterized by a largely imported labor force from 
Middle Eastern and Asian labor markets . 4 In addition to these two location 
factors, bilateral investment treaties and property rights protection institutions 
are two other location factors, which encourage FDI in the GCC region . 5
The empirical model therefore explains FDI in terms of location-related 
variables, lagged FDI to capture the dynamic adjustment of FDI similar to Egger 
and Merlo (2007), and a time trend . The empirical model is provided in equation 
(1) as:
FDIi,t = β0 + β1FDIi,t-1 + β2BITi,t + β3OILi,t + β4EDUCi,t + β5INSTi,t + β6YEARi,t + 
εi,t  (1)
where FDI is the stock of real inward FDI relative to real GDP . 6 Using 
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the stock rather than the flows of FDI, as the dependent variable, accounts for 
the accumulation of FDI over time . The stock of FDI is normalized by GDP 
to account for differences in the size of GCC economies . BIT is the number of 
annual BITs contracted . OIL is oil resources measured by relative oil production, 
i .e . oil production in millions of barrels per day as a percentage of oil reserves 
in millions of barrels . The construction of oil resources in such way takes into 
account the fact FDI is needed in the oil extraction and exploration processes and 
the relative utilization of oil resources which affects FDI . EDUC is the percentage 
of secondary education enrollment to total school enrollment to proxy for the 
quality of human capital . INST is institutional quality – the quality of property 
rights protection - proxied by ICRG’s law and order indicator, a component of 
the political risk index . YEAR is a time trend to account for FDI accumulation 
over time . The subscripts i and t are country and time indicators. ε is an error 
term . The empirical model is double logarithmic, except for BIT, which has zero 
values for most of the 1980s, and for YEAR . 
Modeling BITs in the empirical model takes into account two considerations . 
The first is the distinction between a government’s willingness to commit to 
property rights protection, and its actual commitment . Signing a BIT indicates 
willingness to commit to property rights protection and investment dispute 
settlement, while ratifying a BIT indicates actual commitment . The paper 
estimates separate empirical models using signed and ratified BITs . This 
distinction helps separate the FDI responses of foreign investors to these two 
degrees of government commitment to property rights protection .
The second consideration is that each GCC country has contracted BITs 
with different countries for different motives, and depending on the nature of the 
economic, political, and historical relations it has with them . As these differences 
are most likely to be associated with the income level of the contracting partner, 
this paper distinguishes the impact of contracted BITs by the income level of 
the contracting partner, and separately estimates the empirical model for each 
income-distinguished contracted BIT . The paper distinguishes the impact of 
BITs contracted with a) high income OECD countries, b) high income non-
OECD countries, c) upper middle income countries, and d) lower middle income 
countries . Low income countries are omitted for their low investment potential .
We should note a number of points regarding data availability and model 
specification. First, there is neither bilateral nor sectoral FDI data available for 
the GCC countries . Thus the aggregate FDI data are used in this paper . Second, 
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in selecting a measure of human capital, it would have been better if a measure of 
the composition (domestic versus expatriate) of the labour force and the degree of 
skills had been available . Even the used measure of education, which is relative 
school enrolment, does not provide an indication on whether such enrolment is 
for indigenous as opposed to foreign students. Third, from a model specification 
perspective, because oil drives economic activity in the GCC countries, it is highly 
correlated with market size and trade both exports and imports . 7 Consequently, 
GDP, merchandise exports, and merchandise imports were excluded from the 
empirical model to avoid serious multicollinearity . Fourth, population size and 
education, as measured by school enrolment, are correlated to each other, and 
thus population size has been excluded . 8
FDI and BIT are obtained from UNCTAD’s FDI and bilateral investment 
treaties online databases . 9 INST is obtained from ICRG’s political risk index . 
OIL is obtained from Energy Information Administration . 10 EDUC is obtained 
from the United Nations Common Database . 11
Panel data covering the period 1984–2002 is used . The panel dataset is 
unbalanced, however, due to two missing observations on INST for Oman and 
Qatar for the year 1984, and twenty two sporadically missing observations on 
EDUC for the six GCC countries . The sample period could have been lengthened 
had data on EDUC been available beyond 2002 . STATA 9 .0 is the econometric 
package used in estimation .
5. Empirical issues and estimation methodology
In estimating the empirical model, endogeneity is an important econometric 
issue which is taken into account . Endogeneity in the empirical model of 
equation 1 results from a) reversed causality between BITs and FDI, as well as 
between relative oil production and FDI; b) the correlation between the lagged 
dependent variable and the country effect; and c) the presence of time-invariant 
unobservable country effect, such as the degree of strength of international 
relationships a GCC country has with the rest of the world–including those 
countries with which BITs are contracted . Endogeneity results in inconsistent 
OLS estimates .
In the presence of endogeneity, this paper adopts a difference GMM 
estimator for dynamic panel models proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) . This 
approach has been recently adopted by Egger and Merlo (2007) in examining the 
dynamic impact of BITs on FDI stocks .
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6. Empirical results
Before estimating the empirical model, a Ramsey model specification 
RESET test was conducted on the ordinary least squares regressions of the 
empirical model for different income classifications of BITs contracting 
partners, and the p values for these tests are presented in Table 1 . All results lend 
support to the null hypothesis of no variable omission, except for the ratified 
BITs with high income non-OECD countries, which is statistically significant 
at the 10 percent level only . 12 In addition, multicollinearity is explored and the 
mean variance inflation factor (VIF) is also reported. Bowerman et al. (2005) 
consider multicollinearity as “severe” if the largest VIF is greater than 10 and 
the mean VIF is substantially greater than 1 . The highest VIF did not exceed 10, 
and the mean VIF did not exceed 3 in any of the specifications, suggesting that 
correlation among the explanatory variables is reasonable . 13
The results of the one-step difference GMM estimator are presented in 
Table 2 . 14 In all specifications the Wald test indicates joint significance of the 
explanatory variables . The results of the Sargan test indicate that the instruments 
are not correlated with the residuals of the first difference regression. 





(1A) (2A) (3A) (4A) (5A)
FDI-1 0 .443a 0 .447a 0 .428b 0 .439a 0 .438a
[0 .161] [0 .160] [0 .172] [0 .168] [0 .168]
BIT 0 .01 0 .041 -0 .396 0 .054 0 .008
[0 .025] [0 .044] [0 .254] [0 .059] [0 .048]
OIL -0 .253a -0 .261b -0 .249b -0 .256b -0 .254a
[0 .095] [0 .108] [0 .105] [0 .105] [0 .086]
INST 0 .824a 0 .849a 0 .814a 0 .835a 0 .831a
[0 .256] [0 .281] [0 .287] [0 .270] [0 .263]
EDUC -0 .927a -0 .939a -1 .002a -0 .903a -0 .931a
[0 .340] [0 .353] [0 .364] [0 .336] [0 .342]
YEAR 0 .012 0 .01 0 .019 0 .011 0 .013
[0 .018] [0 .020] [0 .017] [0 .019] [0 .018]
Wald test χ2 255 .8 348 .1 97 .5 224 .9 253 .01
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Sargan test χ2 82 .6 83 .13 86 .35 82 .14 82 .95
Serial correlation test 0 .105 0 .107 0 .092 0 .112 0 .095
Short-term impact 
(%)
- - - - -
Long-term impact (%) - - - - -
Ratified
(1B) (2B) (3B) (4B) (5B)
FDI-1 0 .420a 0 .425b 0 .476a 0 .460a 0 .441a
[0 .163] [0 .171] [0 .158] [0 .160] [0 .168]
BIT -0.069c -0 .09 1.427a -0.419a 0 .038
[0 .037] [0 .083] [0 .047] [0 .088] [0 .052]
OIL -0 .273a -0 .279a -0 .234a -0 .287a -0 .266b
[0 .105] [0 .100] [0 .080] [0 .084] [0 .109]
INST 0 .875a 0 .849a 0 .655a 0 .854a 0 .807a
[0 .254] [0 .258] [0 .178] [0 .235] [0 .263]
EDUC -0 .815b -0 .835b -0 .725b -0 .840a -0 .957a
[0 .336] [0 .388] [0 .298] [0 .295] [0 .320]
YEAR 0 .01 0 .012 0 .01 0 .011 0 .014
[0 .017] [0 .018] [0 .018] [0 .018] [0 .016]
Observations 72 72 72 72 72
Wald test χ2 268 .6 1792 .8 53027 193 .4 692 .5
Sargan test χ2 79 .2 80 .85 82 .17 72 .6 82 .3
Serial Correlation test 0 .104 0 .1 0 .1 0 .132 0 .082
Short-term impact (%) -6.6 - 316.6 -34.2 -
Long-term impact (%) -11. 5 - 604.2 -63.4 -
Robust standard errors in brackets. Coefficients of the difference of lagged FDI, OIL, INST, EDUC, 
and BIT reported. Letters a, b, c significant at 1, 5, 10% level, respectively. H0 for Sargan over-
identification test: instruments not correlated with residuals. H0 for serial correlation test: errors in 
first-difference regression exhibit no second-order serial correlation (p values reported) . 
The results of the serial correlation test indicate that the errors in the first 
difference regression exhibit no second-order serial correlation for almost 
all specifications. Only in specifications (3A) and (5A), serial correlation is 
marginally significant (at the 10 percent level). The results of these three tests 
suggest that the model specification is satisfactory, in particular for ratified BITs. 
Since the coefficients of explanatory variables other than BIT do not vary much 
in the different specifications, we will examine them first. These coefficients 
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are interpreted as elasticities since the explanatory variables are expressed in 
logarithmic form. In all specifications the coefficients of lagged FDI are positive, 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level at least, and range between 0.4 and 
0.5. The coefficients of OIL and EDUC are negative and statistically significant at 
the 5 percent level at least . The sign of OIL coefficient seems surprising, however. 
Since the oil variable by construction indicates the degree of utilization of oil 
resources, the interpretation of its coefficient suggests that a 1 percent increase 
in the degree of utilization results in the reduction of relative FDI, i .e . relative to 
GDP, by about 0.3 percent in specification (1B) for example. This is interpreted 
as indicating that increased oil production results in a higher rate of increase in 
GDP than in FDI, resulting in a decline of the share of FDI in GDP . The negative 
coefficient of EDUC on FDI lends support to the lagging quality of education in 
the GCC countries . 15 The positive and statistically significant coefficient (at the 
1 percent level) of INST highlights the importance of institutional quality to FDI 
in GCC countries: an improvement in the quality of domestic institutions by 1 
percent results in an increase in relative FDI by nearly 1 percent .
None of the signed BIT coefficients in the upper panel of Table 2 are 
statistically insignificant, suggesting no FDI response to GCC willingness to 
commit to property rights protection. Interestingly not all ratified BIT coefficients 
are both positive and statistically significant, as the lower panel of Table 2 shows. 
Some coefficients are rather negative in the first place.
The ratified BIT coefficient is positive and statistically significant only for 
BITs ratified with high income non-OECD countries, as shown in specification 
3B, but negative and statistically significant for all (non-income distinguished) 
ratified BITs and those ratified with upper middle income countries, as shown 
in specifications 1B and 4B respectively. The coefficient of all ratified BIT in 
specification (1B) is negative and marginally statistically significant: an increase 
in the number of ratified BITs by one, results in a decrease in relative FDI by 6.6 
percent in the short term and by 11 .5 percent in the long term . 16
But could all BITs ratified discourage FDI?  To understand this result, we 
should first point out that the majority of all ratified BITs are composed of BITs 
ratified with OECD and upper middle income countries, whose coefficients 
are negative, as shown in specifications 2B and 4B. The composition of all 
ratified BITs therefore helps understand the negative coefficient. The negative 
coefficient of ratified BITs with upper middle income countries may suggest that 
although BITs are contracted to boost investors’ confidence about property rights 
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protection in the GCC countries, they still send a negative signal about property 
rights protection to foreign investors . BITs therefore seem to lack credibility 
among foreign investors in upper middle income countries, and thus generate an 
opposite FDI impact to what is initially intended .
The coefficient of ratified BITs with high income non-OECD countries in 
specification (3B) is positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
The corresponding short term and long term impacts suggest that an increase 
in the number of ratified BITs with high income non-OECD countries, whether 
outside the region (e .g . Brunei Darussalam) or inside the region (e .g . Kuwait and 
UAE), by one results in an increase in relative FDI by more than threefold in the 
short term and more than sixfold in the long term . This result suggests that the 
signaling of property rights protection is believed and responded to favorably by 
investors from within the GCC region (and from Brunei Darussalam) either on 
their own or in response to political directives from their governments .
7. Robustness
The robustness of the results is checked in three respects . First, the second 
lag of the dependent variable (FDI-2) is included in the empirical model (Table 3) .
 
17 Second, a recent sample period (1990–2002) is used, since the number of BITs 
increased significantly starting 1990 (Table 4), and FDI-2 is added to the empirical 
mode using this recent sample (Table 5) . Third, outward FDI (FDIOUT) is added 
to the empirical model, since BITs provide property rights protection not only 
to foreign investments in the GCC countries but to GCC investments in partner 
countries as well (Table 6) . 18 With FDIOUT included in the empirical model, 
which is discovered to be highly correlated with EDUC, three further robustness 
checks are conducted: EDUC is excluded from the empirical model (Table 7), 
a recent sample period 1990–2002 is adopted (Table 8), and BITs contracted by 
other GCC countries (BITOTHERS) are included (Table 9) .
When FDI-2 is included in the empirical model (Table 3), most BIT 
coefficients slightly decrease in absolute terms but their statistical significance 
remains the same, compared to Table 2 . The modelling of FDI-2 in the empirical 
model has absorbed some of BITs (negative) impact on FDI . Thus the negative 
short term impact of all ratified BITs and BITs ratified with upper middle income 
countries in specifications (1B) and (4B) improves slightly. The positive short 
term impact of BITs ratified with high income non-OECD countries declines 
slightly, while the long term impact increases significantly. For ratified BITs with 
upper middle income countries, the short term negative impact improves slightly, 
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while negative long term impact worsens significantly.
When the sample period is restricted to the 1990s and early 2000s during 
which GCC inward FDI increased significantly (Table 4), the coefficients of 
FDI-1 and BIT improve significantly. The negative coefficient of all ratified BITs 
drops by nearly half compared to Table 2, but becomes statistically insignificant. 
The positive coefficient of BITs ratified with high income non-OECD countries 
in specification (3B), improves and so does the negative coefficient of ratified 
BITs with upper middle income countries in specification (4B).
Table 3 . Impact of BITs on FDI in GCC Countries (1984–2002): + FDI-
All OECD Non-OECD UM LM
Signed
(1A) (2A) (3A) (4A) (5A)
FDI-1 0 .587a 0 .576a 0 .562a 0 .569a 0 .582a
[0 .187] [0 .188] [0 .196] [0 .194] [0 .190]
BIT 0 .019 0 .038 -0 .405 0 .048 0 .037
[0 .016] [0 .039] [0 .248] [0 .053] [0 .044]
OIL -0 .256b -0 .266b -0 .255b -0 .262b -0 .249a
[0 .105] [0 .113] [0 .110] [0 .111] [0 .092]
INST 0 .854a 0 .884a 0 .851a 0 .871a 0 .858a
[0 .284] [0 .304] [0 .316] [0 .296] [0 .290]
EDUC -1 .009a -1 .020a -1 .088a -0 .989a -1 .017a
[0 .346] [0 .363] [0 .351] [0 .352] [0 .346]
YEAR 0 .011 0 .009 0 .018 0 .011 0 .013
[0 .019] [0 .021] [0 .017] [0 .020] [0 .018]
FDI-2 -0 .237b -0 .224b -0 .232b -0 .225b -0 .238b
[0 .108] [0 .106] [0 .104] [0 .108] [0 .106]
Wald test χ2 139 .1 200 .1 47 .4 125 119 .5
Sargan test χ2 73 .92 74 .86 77 .16 74 .11 74 .96
Serial correlation test 0 .215 0 .215 0 .184 0 .217 0 .185
Short-term impact (%) - - - - -
Long-term impact (%) - - - - -
Ratified
(1B) (2B) (3B) (4B) (5B)
FDI-1 0 .546a 0 .550a 0 .587a 0 .585a 0 .568a
©2010 The Author (s)
Journal compilation ©2010 African Centre for Economics and Finance
15
[0 .182] [0 .193] [0 .187] [0 .184] [0 .195]
BIT -0.062c -0 .079 1.393a -0.407a 0 .021
[0 .032] [0 .075] [0 .054] [0 .083] [0 .045]
OIL -0 .278b -0 .282b -0 .240a -0 .292a -0 .268b
[0 .114] [0 .110] [0 .081] [0 .094] [0 .114]
INST 0 .905a 0 .881a 0 .690a 0 .888a 0 .855a
[0 .290] [0 .289] [0 .191] [0 .266] [0 .293]
EDUC -0 .904a -0 .925b -0 .800b -0 .921a -1 .026a
[0 .337] [0 .363] [0 .328] [0 .299] [0 .331]
YEAR 0 .01 0 .011 0 .01 0 .01 0 .013
[0 .018] [0 .018] [0 .018] [0 .018] [0 .017]
FDI-2 -0 .214b -0 .213b -0 .192c -0 .215b -0 .222b
[0 .094] [0 .091] [0 .108] [0 .106] [0 .103]
Observations 72 72 72 72 72
Wald test χ2 49 .6 46 .2 41 .6 81 .4 1093
Sargan test χ2 72 .45 73 .44 73 .04 66 .49 74 .3
Serial correlation test 0 .224 0 .206 0 .194 0 .3 0 .172
Short-term impact (%) -6 - 302.7 -33.4 -
Long-term impact (%) -13.2 - 732.9 -80.6 -
Robust standard errors in brackets. Coefficients of the difference of lagged FDI, OIL, INST, EDUC, 
and BIT reported. Letters a, b, c significant at 1, 5, 10% level, respectively. H0 for Sargan over-
identification test: instruments not correlated with residuals. H0 for serial correlation test: errors in 
first-difference regression exhibit no second-order serial correlation (p values reported) .





(1A) (2A) (3A) (4A) (5A)
FDI-1 0 .678a 0 .675a 0 .625a 0 .647a 0 .633a
[0 .174] [0 .174] [0 .202] [0 .210] [0 .199]
BIT 0 .039 0 .099 -0 .401 0 .276 -0 .073
[0 .046] [0 .086] [0 .260] [0 .228] [0 .065]
OIL -0 .287a -0 .312a -0 .287a -0 .282a -0 .338a
[0 .064] [0 .084] [0 .075] [0 .077] [0 .105]
INST 0 .537b 0 .609b 0 .567b 0 .574b 0 .631b
[0 .221] [0 .292] [0 .284] [0 .275] [0 .286]
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EDUC -0 .734 -0 .838 -0 .913 -0 .703c -0 .725c
[0 .510] [0 .637] [0 .597] [0 .381] [0 .419]
YEAR 0 .02 0 .015 0 .034 0 .019 0 .019
[0 .025] [0 .028] [0 .028] [0 .027] [0 .023]
Wald test χ2 633 .8 243 .2 1061 .9 972 .2 1132 .5
Sargan test χ2 52 .92 54 .71 56 .6 53 .58 51 .02
Serial correlation test 0 .196 0 .183 0 .163 0 .181 0 .173
Short-term impact (%) - - - - -
Long-term impact (%) - - - - -
Ratified
(1B) (2B) (3B) (4B) (5B)
FDI-1 0 .611a 0 .613a 0 .708a 0 .659a 0 .666a
[0 .210] [0 .211] [0 .194] [0 .196] [0 .193]
BIT -0 .034 -0 .088 1 .476a -0 .399a 0 .094
[0 .049] [0 .090] [0 .035] [0 .120] [0 .065]
OIL -0 .313a -0 .332a -0 .269a -0 .321a -0 .331a
[0 .081] [0 .102] [0 .035] [0 .077] [0 .121]
INST 0 .653b 0 .653b 0 .379b 0 .647b 0 .509b
[0 .285] [0 .310] [0 .159] [0 .312] [0 .231]
EDUC -0 .667 -0 .581 -0 .327 -0 .412 -0 .864c
[0 .532] [0 .572] [0 .285] [0 .374] [0 .464]
YEAR 0 .019 0 .018 0 .013 0 .01 0 .029
[0 .025] [0 .025] [0 .020] [0 .021] [0 .025]
Observations 47 47 47 47 47
Wald test χ2 1203 .9 4457 .1 20834 .1 510 .6 3882 .7
Sargan test χ2 51 .58 51 .08 51 .34 45 .0 50 .2
Serial correlation test 0 .173 0 .160 0 .172 0 .221 0 .181
Short-term impact (%) - - 337 .5 -32 .9 -
Long-term impact (%) - - 1156 .0 -112 .7 -
Robust standard errors in brackets. Coefficients of the difference of lagged FDI, 
OIL, INST, EDUC, and BIT reported. Letters a, b, c significant at 1, 5, 10% level, 
respectively . H0 for Sargan over-identification test: instruments not correlated with 
residuals . H0 for serial correlation test: errors in first-difference regression exhibit no 
second-order serial correlation (p values reported) .
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When FDI-2 is included in the model (Table 5), the coefficient of FDI-
1 improves further compared to Tables 3 and 4 . Compared to Table 3, the 
coefficients of BITs ratified with high income non-OECD countries and upper 
middle income countries improve . Thus the absolute value of the long term 
impact more than doubles for BITs ratified with high income non-OECD and 
upper middle income countries .





(1A) (2A) (3A) (4A) (5A)
FDI-1 0 .935a 0 .862a 0 .811a 0 .849a 0 .803a
[0 .228] [0 .194] [0 .210] [0 .225] [0 .216]
BIT 0 .062 0 .103 -0 .414 0 .302 -0 .033
[0 .048] [0 .086] [0 .265] [0 .214] [0 .046]
OIL -0 .243a -0 .284a -0 .258a -0 .249a -0 .292a
[0 .071] [0 .090] [0 .080] [0 .083] [0 .102]
INST 0 .561a 0 .660b 0 .617b 0 .627b 0 .664b
[0 .177] [0 .260] [0 .270] [0 .251] [0 .271]
EDUC -1 .290c -1 .293 -1 .372c -1 .186 -1 .145c
[0 .692] [0 .853] [0 .762] [0 .745] [0 .613]
YEAR 0 .026 0 .02 0 .04 0 .025 0 .026
[0 .030] [0 .032] [0 .032] [0 .033] [0 .027]
FDI-2 -0 .465 -0 .373c -0 .375c -0 .403 -0 .339
[0 .298] [0 .220] [0 .227] [0 .266] [0 .216]
Wald test χ2 6241 .9 1578 35 .9 79 .2 2181 .7
Sargan test χ2 42 .87 46 .35 47 .76 44 .69 44 .79
Serial correlation test 0 .378 0 .278 0 .23 0 .409 0 .245
Short-term impact (%) - - - - -
Long-term impact (%) - - - - -
Ratified
(1B) (2B) (3B) (4B) (5B)
FDI-1 0 .797a 0 .781a 0 .833a 0 .828a 0 .818a
[0 .212] [0 .217] [0 .197] [0 .209] [0 .213]
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BIT -0 .016 -0 .068 1.425a -0.384a 0 .069
[0 .043] [0 .074] [0 .071] [0 .105] [0 .055]
OIL -0 .280a -0 .300a -0 .250a -0 .294a -0 .298b
[0 .074] [0 .090] [0 .046] [0 .076] [0 .117]
INST 0 .676b 0 .687b 0 .422b 0 .692b 0 .579a
[0 .266] [0 .292] [0 .170] [0 .311] [0 .224]
EDUC -1 .130c -1 .013c -0 .651c -0 .836b -1 .224b
[0 .680] [0 .584] [0 .395] [0 .378] [0 .597]
YEAR 0 .026 0 .024 0 .018 0 .015 0 .032
[0 .028] [0 .026] [0 .022] [0 .021] [0 .027]
FDI-2 -0 .35 -0 .327c -0 .256 -0 .341 -0 .323c
[0 .213] [0 .189] [0 .212] [0 .221] [0 .193]
Observations 47 47 47 47 47
Wald test χ2 1545 .3 16 .63 868 .2 17158 .9 2232 .2
Sargan test χ2 44 .85 44 .58 43 .46 39 .61 44 .2
Serial correlation test 0 .271 0 .296 0 .182 0 .517 0 .229
Short-term impact (%) - - 315.8 -31.9 -
Long-term impact (%) - - 1890.9 -185.4 -
Robust standard errors in brackets. Coefficients of the difference of lagged FDI, OIL, INST, EDUC, 
and BIT reported. Letters a, b, c significant at 1, 5, 10% level, respectively. H0 for Sargan over-
identification test: instruments not correlated with residuals. H0 for serial correlation test: errors in 
first-difference regression exhibit no second-order serial correlation (p values reported) .
When FDIOUT is included in the empirical model (Table 6), the coefficients 
of FDI-1 drop by nearly half, which reduces the absolute value of BIT long 
term impact. The absolute values of the coefficients of all ratified BITs and 
BITs ratified with high income non-OECD and upper middle income countries 
change slightly compared to the coefficients in Table 2. The coefficient of all 
ratified BITs worsens, while those of ratified BITs with high income non-OECD 
countries and upper middle income countries improve . The resulting negative 
long term impact of all ratified BITs and of ratified BITs with upper middle 
income countries improves by about 20 and 30 percent, respectively, while the 
positive impact of ratified BITs with high income non-OECD countries worsens 
by about 20 percent . 
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Table 6 . Impact of BITs on FDI in GCC Countries (1984–2002): + FDIOUT
All OECD non-OECD UM LM
Signed
(1A) (2A) (3A) (4A) (5A)
FDI-1 0 .261a 0 .263a 0 .249a 0 .250a 0 .246a
[0 .062] [0 .071] [0 .071] [0 .073] [0 .073]
BIT 0 .016 0 .055 -0 .372 0 .084 -0 .018
[0 .028] [0 .045] [0 .271] [0 .054] [0 .044]
OIL -0 .204a -0 .216a -0 .206a -0 .206a -0 .217a
[0 .052] [0 .068] [0 .065] [0 .067] [0 .057]
INST 0 .597 0 .649 0 .591 0 .61 0 .622
[0 .417] [0 .468] [0 .459] [0 .432] [0 .430]
EDUC -0 .595 -0 .622 -0 .669 -0 .568 -0 .613
[0 .509] [0 .534] [0 .534] [0 .499] [0 .538]
YEAR -0 .007 -0 .012 0 .001 -0 .009 -0 .007
[0 .013] [0 .016] [0 .013] [0 .015] [0 .014]
FDIOUT 0 .008 0 .013 -0 .001 0 .014 0 .01
[0 .033] [0 .032] [0 .044] [0 .030] [0 .037]
Wald test χ2 10.17 11.77 15.24 11.06 1598 .9
Sargan test χ2 62 .45 62 .74 66 61 .65 62 .24
Serial correlation test 0 .111 0 .111 0 .102 0 .115 0 .103
Short-term impact (%) - - - - -
Long-term impact (%) - - - - -
Ratified
(1B) (2B) (3B) (4B) (5B)
FDI-1 0 .230a 0 .236a 0 .270a 0 .283a 0 .258a
[0 .054] [0 .061] [0 .075] [0 .060] [0 .071]
BIT -0.073b -0 .096 1.509a -0.380a 0 .064
[0 .035] [0 .073] [0 .061] [0 .121] [0 .067]
OIL -0 .213a -0 .217a -0 .196a -0 .244a -0 .212a
[0 .063] [0 .063] [0 .046] [0 .061] [0 .060]
INST 0 .687 0 .651 0 .281 0 .662c 0 .579
[0 .426] [0 .426] [0 .267] [0 .363] [0 .413]
EDUC -0 .543 -0 .562 -0 .255 -0 .552 -0 .658
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[0 .493] [0 .529] [0 .489] [0 .450] [0 .531]
YEAR -0 .009 -0 .007 -0 .01 -0 .008 -0 .004
[0 .014] [0 .014] [0 .015] [0 .013] [0 .013]
FDIOUT 0 .021 0 .021 0 .003 0 .01 0 .005
[0 .031] [0 .036] [0 .029] [0 .041] [0 .045]
Observations 61 61 61 61 61
Wald test χ2 188 .8 12.72 47 .06 14 .59 11.43
Sargan test χ2 58 .85 60 .6 60 .3 54 .4 62
Serial correlation test 0 .101 0 .107 0 .1 0 .115 0 .082
Short-term impact (%) -7.0 - 352.2 -31.6 -
Long-term impact (%) -9.1 - 482.5 -44.1 -
Robust standard errors in brackets. Coefficients of the difference of lagged FDI, FDIOUT, OIL, 
INST, EDUC, and BIT reported. Letters a, b, c significant at 1, 5, 10% level, respectively. χ2(7) at 1 
and 5% level is 18 .48 and 14 .07, respectively . H0 for Sargan over-identification test: instruments not 
correlated with residuals . H0 for serial correlation test: errors in first-difference regression exhibit 
no second-order serial correlation (p values reported) . 
The inclusion of FDIOUT results in two additional major changes in 
coefficient estimates. First, the absolute value of the coefficient of OIL decreases. 
In other words, the negative influence of oil on FDI improves as a result. Second, 
the coefficients of INST and EDUC become statistically insignificant. The latter 
result is attributed to the high positive correlation between EDUC and FDIOUT, 
which amounts to about 0.67 and is statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
When EDUC is excluded from the empirical model (Table 7), FDI-1 
coefficients increase significantly in both the upper and lower panels of the table, 
compared to those of Tables 2 and 6 . Also the OIL coefficient worsens and the 
statistical significance of INST coefficient improves compared to Table 6.
Table 7 . Impact of BITs on FDI in GCC Countries (1984–2002): + FDIOUT - EDUC
All OECD non-OECD UM LM
Signed
(1A) (2A) (3A) (4A) (5A)
FDI-1 0 .727a 0 .744a 0 .727a 0 .735a 0 .731a
[0 .065] [0 .062] [0 .069] [0 .063] [0 .063]
BIT 0.019a 0.055c -0.153c 0 .01 0.011a
[0 .004] [0 .030] [0 .091] [0 .009] [0 .003]
OIL -0 .240a -0 .236a -0 .239a -0 .238a -0 .239a
[0 .064] [0 .067] [0 .067] [0 .065] [0 .063]
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INST 0 .541c 0 .542c 0 .588c 0 .565c 0 .565c
[0 .313] [0 .311] [0 .356] [0 .333] [0 .332]
YEAR -0 .007 -0 .007 -0 .005 -0 .006 -0 .006
[0 .008] [0 .008] [0 .008] [0 .008] [0 .008]
FDIOUT -0 .054b -0 .049c -0 .053c -0 .050c -0 .051b
[0 .025] [0 .026] [0 .029] [0 .027] [0 .026]
Wald test χ2 1624 .8 648 .7 806 .7 1843 .2 1770
Sargan test χ2 94 .1 94 .8 94 .6 93 .7 94
Serial correlation test 0 .117 0 .125 0 .117 0 .117 0 .12
Short-term impact (%) 1.9 5.7 -14.2 - 1.1
Long-term impact (%) 7 22 .1 -52 - 4.1
Ratified
(1B) (2B) (3B) (4B) (5B)
FDI-1 0 .748a 0 .740a 0 .785a 0 .745a 0 .734a
[0 .056] [0 .055] [0 .045] [0 .057] [0 .064]
BIT -0.033b -0 .044 1.361a -0.234a 0 .019
[0 .013] [0 .038] [0 .036] [0 .021] [0 .029]
OIL -0 .237a -0 .232a -0 .220a -0 .251a -0 .235a
[0 .066] [0 .069] [0 .052] [0 .054] [0 .064]
INST 0 .596c 0 .579c 0 .247a 0 .649b 0 .580c
[0 .343] [0 .337] [0 .078] [0 .311] [0 .340]
YEAR -0 .004 -0 .005 0 .001 -0 .007 -0 .007
[0 .008] [0 .008] [0 .006] [0 .007] [0 .008]
FDIOUT -0 .051c -0 .052c -0 .060a -0 .050c -0 .052c
[0 .030] [0 .027] [0 .022] [0 .027] [0 .027]
Observations 98 98 98 98 98
Wald test χ2 3,542 .7 2,378 .6 137,860 2,455 .8 3,525
Sargan test χ2 92 .6 93 .5 95 91 .5 94
Serial correlation test 0 .12 0 .116 0 .126 0 .138 0 .12
Short-term impact (%) -3.2 - 290 -20.9 -
Long-term impact (%) -12.9 - 1348.9 -81.8 -
Robust standard errors in brackets. Coefficients of the difference of lagged FDI, FDIOUT, OIL, 
INST, and BIT reported. Letters a, b, c significant at 1, 5, 10% level, respectively. H0 for Sargan over-
identification test: instruments not correlated with residuals. H0 for serial correlation test: errors in 
first-difference regression exhibit no second-order serial correlation (p values reported) . 
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Interestingly, the positive coefficients of all signed BITs and those signed 
with OECD countries, which were statistically insignificant in previous tables, 
have become statistically significant, as one would normally expect from signing 
BITs . Hence the short term and long term impact of those signed BITs becomes 
positive. The negative coefficient of BITs signed with high income non-OECD 
countries has also become statistically significant.
For ratified BITs, the positive long term impact of BITs ratified with high 
income non-OECD countries nearly triples compared to Table 6, while the 
short term impact worsens by nearly 20 percent . The tripling long term impact 
is supported by the anecdotal evidence on the increase in intra-GCC FDI, 
especially in the second half of the 1990s and early 2000s, with FDI flowing 
intra-regionally . Such impact is emphasized when the sample period is reduced 
to the 1990-2002 period, as shown in Table 8 .
Table 8 . Impact of BITs on FDI in GCC Countries (1990–2002): + FDIOUT - EDUC
All OECD non-OECD UM LM
Signed
(1A) (2A) (3A) (4A) (5A)
FDI-1 0 .705a 0 .732a 0 .708a 0 .712a 0 .727a
[0 .048] [0 .045] [0 .050] [0 .051] [0 .064]
BIT 0.021a 0 .079 -0.154c 0.049a -0 .009
[0 .008] [0 .052] [0 .081] [0 .015] [0 .021]
OIL -0 .253a -0 .243a -0 .247a -0 .238a -0 .244a
[0 .082] [0 .082] [0 .083] [0 .084] [0 .079]
INST 0 .742c 0 .730b 0 .807c 0 .761c 0 .785c
[0 .391] [0 .368] [0 .447] [0 .404] [0 .432]
YEAR -0 .008 -0 .009 -0 .006 -0 .007 -0 .007
[0 .006] [0 .007] [0 .006] [0 .007] [0 .007]
FDIOUT 0 .001 0 .013 0 .005 0 .011 0 .01
[0 .028] [0 .027] [0 .030] [0 .028] [0 .028]
Wald test χ2 554 .4 617 35917 .3 997 .1 4778
Sargan test χ2 69 .3 71 .4 69 .2 68 .5 64 .5
Serial correlation test 0 .381 0 .066 0 .153 0 .414 0 .224
Short-term impact (%) 2.1 - -14.3 5 -
Long-term impact (%) 7.2 - -48.9 17.4 -
Ratified
©2010 The Author (s)
Journal compilation ©2010 African Centre for Economics and Finance
23
(1B) (2B) (3B) (4B) (5B)
FDI-1 0 .729a 0 .728a 0 .801a 0 .734a 0 .717a
[0 .054] [0 .053] [0 .090] [0 .051] [0 .053]
BIT -0 .018 -0 .04 1.325a -0.221a 0 .032
[0 .018] [0 .038] [0 .102] [0 .029] [0 .033]
OIL -0 .239a -0 .231a -0 .198a -0 .243a -0 .240a
[0 .083] [0 .087] [0 .053] [0 .076] [0 .081]
INST 0 .792c 0 .791c 0 .362a 0 .846b 0 .804c
[0 .427] [0 .437] [0 .119] [0 .418] [0 .458]
YEAR -0 .005 -0 .006 0 -0 .008 -0 .009
[0 .007] [0 .007] [0 .004] [0 .006] [0 .008]
FDIOUT 0 .007 0 .006 -0 .02 0 .004 0 .001
[0 .029] [0 .027] [0 .024] [0 .027] [0 .031]
Observations 74 74 74 74 74
Wald test χ2 8929 .1 1689 .9 227615 .9 2494 .3 499 .6
Sargan test χ2 68 .1 68 .5 74 .5 66 .8 68 .6
Serial correlation test 0 .458 0 .325 0 .186 0 .855 0 .229
Short-term impact (%) - - 276.2 -19.8 -
Long-term impact (%) - - 1388 -74.5 -
Robust standard errors in brackets. Coefficients of the difference of lagged FDI, FDIOUT, OIL, 
INST, and BIT reported. Letters a, b, c significant at 1, 5, 10% level, respectively. H0 for Sargan 
over-identification test: instruments not correlated with residuals. H0 for serial correlation test: 
errors in first-difference regression exhibit no second-order serial correlation (p values reported) .
Tables 7 and 8 show the coefficients and thus the impact of BITs for some 
contracting partners may differ by the degree of commitment to property rights 
protection. In Tables 7 and 8 the coefficient and impact of signed BITs with 
high income non-OECD countries is negative, but turns positive when BITs are 
ratified. This result suggests that this group of largely GCC countries need a 
high degree of commitment as reflected in ratified as opposed to signed BITs in 
order to be FDI fruitful . The negative impact of signed treaties may suggest that 
signing a treaty signals to investors from other (GCC) countries the imperfect 
domestic institutional function of property rights protection .
 The coefficient and impact of signed BITs with OECD countries 
is positive but turns negative and statistically insignificant when BITs are 
ratified (Table 7). When the sample period is reduced to 1990-2002 (Table 8), 
the coefficients and impact of signed and ratified BITs become statistically 
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significant. These results suggest first that OECD FDI may have taken place 
largely during the 1980s, possibly in association to oil; the response of OECD 
FDI to signed and ratified BITs is statistically insignificant in 1990-2002. In 
addition when considering FDI in the GCC region OECD foreign investors seem 
to weigh more domestic institutions in their investment decisions, as reflected 
in the positive INST coefficient in specifications (2A) and (2B) of Tables 7 and 
8, than investment treaties. The negative coefficient of ratified BITs, though 
statistically insignificant, may lend initial support to the negative response of 
OECD investors to those BITs, reflecting an inadequate commitment by GCC 
countries to the improvement and strengthening of the imperfect property rights 
protection function .
The positive coefficient and impact of signed BITs with upper middle income 
countries is statistically significant only in 1990-2002, as shown by specification 
(4A) of Table 8 . This suggests some relatively recent positive response to those 
BITs. But a negative coefficient and impact is observed in the case of ratified 
BITs regardless of the sample period, as specification 4B shows in Tables 7 and 
8. An interpretation similar to the one obtained for ratified BITs with OECD 
countries, as discussed above, may hold .
   Can a negative BIT coefficient possibly result from competition among 
GCC countries to contract BITs? To address this point, BITOTHERS is introduced 
into the model (Table 9). The coefficients of BITOTHERS for OECD countries 
in specifications (2A) and (2B) and for high income non-OECD countries in 
specification (3B) are positive, suggesting that FDI flows into one GCC country 
when another GCC country contracts BITs with partner countries of the same 
income level . 19 In other words, FDI geographically spills over when GCC 
countries, as a group, contract BITs with the same group of OECD and high 
income non-OECD contracting partners .
Table 9 . Impact of BITs on FDI in GCC Countries (1990–2002): 
+ FDIOUT + BITOTHERS - EDUC
All OECD non-OECD UM LM
Signed
(1A) (2A) (3A) (4A) (5A)
FDI-1 0 .705a 0 .744a 0 .711a 0 .712a 0 .727a
[0 .048] [0 .042] [0 .051] [0 .050] [0 .063]
BIT 0.020a 0 .073 -0.161b 0.050a -0 .009
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[0 .007] [0 .047] [0 .078] [0 .018] [0 .021]
OIL -0 .248a -0 .185a -0 .249a -0 .239a -0 .243a
[0 .079] [0 .070] [0 .086] [0 .084] [0 .078]
INST 0 .735c 0 .606c 0 .816c 0 .763c 0 .784c
[0 .385] [0 .324] [0 .440] [0 .402] [0 .427]
YEAR -0 .009 -0 .012c -0 .005 -0 .007 -0 .007
[0 .007] [0 .007] [0 .007] [0 .006] [0 .009]
FDIOUT 0 0 .007 0 .006 0 .01 0 .008
[0 .028] [0 .027] [0 .030] [0 .028] [0 .030]
BITOTHERS 0 .001 0.028a -0 .026 0 .002 0 .002
[0 .002] [0 .009] [0 .016] [0 .015] [0 .010]
Wald test 516 .2 2446 .3 709 .5 946 .2 551 .5
Sargan test 68 .4 71 .2 67 .9 67 .5 67 .5
Serial correlation test 0 .392 0 .103 0 .224 0 .415 0 .27
Short-term impact (%) 2.0 - -14.9 5.1 -
Long-term impact (%) 6.8 - -51.5 17.8 -
Ratified
(1B) (2B) (3B) (4B) (5B)
FDI-1 0 .712a 0 .716a 0 .806a 0 .733a 0 .722a
[0 .055] [0 .054] [0 .089] [0 .043] [0 .047]
BIT -0 .004 -0 .043 1.344a -0.237a 0 .03
[0 .028] [0 .041] [0 .099] [0 .045] [0 .033]
OIL -0 .235a -0 .242a -0 .174a -0 .243a -0 .223a
[0 .076] [0 .073] [0 .038] [0 .073] [0 .085]
INST 0 .811c 0 .850c 0 .290b 0 .947b 0 .802c
[0 .417] [0 .435] [0 .125] [0 .478] [0 .453]
YEAR -0 .02 -0 .011 0 .001 -0 .009 -0 .014
[0 .016] [0 .010] [0 .004] [0 .007] [0 .009]
FDIOUT 0 .001 0 .006 -0 .014 0 .005 -0 .001
[0 .030] [0 .028] [0 .026] [0 .027] [0 .031]
BITOTHERS 0 .022 0.025c 0.134c -0 .054 0.015c
[0 .018] [0 .014] [0 .075] [0 .065] [0 .008]
Observations 74 74 74 74 74
Wald test 1548 .4 2578 1550 .1 67832 .9 488
Sargan test 65 .8 66 .3 74 .2 66 .1 66 .6
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Serial correlation test 0 .995 0 .878 0 .134 0 .72 0 .29
Short-term impact (%) - - 283.4 -21.1 -
Long-term impact (%) - - 1461.0 -79.0 -
Robust standard errors in brackets. Coefficients of the difference of lagged FDI, FDIOUT, OIL, 
INST, BIT, BITOTHERS reported. Letters a, b, c significant at 1, 5, 10% level, respectively. H0 for 
Sargan over-identification test: instruments not correlated with residuals. H0 for serial correlation 
test: errors in first-difference regression exhibit no second-order serial correlation (p values 
reported) . 
8. Conclusion
This paper has empirically examined the short term and long term impact 
of BITs contracting by GCC countries, and distinguished BITs contracting by 
the degree of commitment to property rights protection, and by the income 
level of the contracting partner, to account for the different motives and natures 
of international relationships . The paper has adopted a GMM estimation 
methodology to account for endogeneity .
Empirical evidence suggests three main results . First, the build-up of FDI, 
relative to GDP, in response to GCC countries willingness to commit to protect 
property rights is lacking . Second, there is positive short and long term (relative) 
FDI impact of GCC actual commitment to property rights protection with high 
income non-OECD countries . The commitment to property rights protection is 
responded to favourably by investors largely from within the GCC region and 
Brunei Darussalam . On the other hand there is negative short and long term 
(relative) FDI impact of GCC countries actual commitment to property rights 
protection with upper middle income countries, suggesting that such commitment 
may lack credibility among foreign investors in those countries . Third, investors 
from OECD countries seem to weigh the strength of domestic institutional 
function of property rights protection in their foreign investment decisions as 
opposed to the intended strengthening through bilateral investment treaties . 
This paper has a number of policy implications . First, to improve property 
rights protection, the GCC countries may have to consider strengthening domestic 
institutions together with contracting bilateral investment treaties . Domestic 
institutions seem to matter for OECD investors . Second, with the negative 
impact of overall ratified BITs, there is not much support to the presence of 
positive association between external commitment to property rights protection 
and (relative) FDI impact. Third, with the negative impact of BITs ratified with 
upper middle income countries, there is not much support to the presence of 
positive association between the income level of the contracting partner and 
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BITs impact on relative FDI either . The empirical evidence of this paper lends 
some justification to the GCC approach of purchasing technology and relying on 
expatriate human capital directly .
Notes: 
1 . Country income level classification follows World Bank (2005).
2 . High income OECD countries with which BITs were signed are Austria, 
Belgium and Luxembourg, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, 
Korea, Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, Sweden, UK, and US . High 
income non-OECD countries are Brunei Darussalam, Kuwait, Malta, 
Slovenia, Taiwan, and UAE . Upper middle income countries are Croatia, 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Malaysia, and 
Poland . Lower middle income countries are Algeria, Belarus, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, China, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, 
Morocco, Philippines, Romania, Russia, Serbia and Montenegro, Syria, 
Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, and Ukraine . Low income 
countries are Cuba, Ethiopia, India, Mauritania, Moldova, Mongolia, 
Mozambique, Pakistan, Senegal, Sudan, Tajikistan, and Yemen . The list of 
countries with which GCC BITs are ratified is available from the author.
3 . Author’s calculation based on Energy Information Administration (2007) 
estimates . 
4 . According to the World Bank’s 2005 classification, the GCC countries are 
considered high-income countries with the exception of Saudi Arabia and 
Oman, which are considered upper-middle-income countries .
5 . For a discussion of institutional performance in the GCC countries, see 
Mina (2009; 2007) . 
6 . The stock of FDI is measured in constant 2000 US dollars using the US 
implicit GDP deflator.
7 . The correlation coefficient between relative oil production and real GDP 
(in logarithmic form) is -0.7. Similarly the coefficients between relative 
oil production and exports and imports (in logarithmic forms)are -0 .6 and 
-0 .55, respectively .
8 . The correlation coefficients between population size and school enrollment 
in primary, secondary and tertiary education are 0 .99, 0 .95, and 0 .92, 
respectively . 
9 .  FDI and BITs data are available at http://www .unctad .org/Templates/Page .
asp?intItemID=3277&lang=1, and http://www .unctad .org/Templates/Page .
asp?intItemID=2344&lang=1, respectively .
10 . Oil data are available at http://www .eia .doe .gov/emeu/international/
contents .html .
11 . Education data are available at http://unstats .un .org/unsd/cdb/cdb_help/
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cdb_quick_start .asp
12 . The null hypothesis of no variable omission failed to be rejected under 
the different robustness checks conducted, as mentioned in the following 
section .
13 . Results are available from the author .
14 . STATA 9 .0 upheld the use of the one-step as opposed to the two-step 
estimator .
15 . World Bank (2008) describes the quality of education in the Middle East 
as disappointing and proclaims the presence of education gaps, in absolute 
terms, compared to other world regions, despite the progress on educational 
attainment .
16 . In the empirical model above, short-term impact is calculated as 
[(exp(β2)-1)*100] while long-term impact is calculated as β2/(1- β1) .
17 . An inclusion/exclusion of a variable in empirical model is noted by +/- sign 
in the table title . 
18 . The measurement of FDIOUT is similar to FDI but with outward FDI 
instead
19. BITOTHERS is the number of annual BITs the other five GCC countries 
contract . The variable is constructed in such a way that partner countries 
are of the same income level to capture the influence of the income level on 
FDI .
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